Perils of Parallelism
Presented our work on Perils of Parallelism at the IC3 camp
I am a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Michigan, hosted by Prof. Ke Wu, where I research secure mechanism designs for blockchains and more. Previously, I finished my doctorate in Computer Science at Duke University, advised by Prof. Kartik Nayak and Prof. Fan Zhang in May 2026. My research is at the intersection of cryptography, algorithmic game theory, and blockchain systems, with a focus on designing incentive-compatible mechanisms for decentralized applications. I work on problems related to censorship resistance, transaction fee markets, and multi-proposer execution in modern blockchains. My recent projects include an Auction-Based Inclusion List Design (AUCIL), a censorship-resistant sealed-bid auction platform, a fee-mechanism design which captures the execution uncertainty of transactions, and an analysis of how censorship resistance is necessarily a trade-off with throughput of the system. Broadly, I am motivated by understanding how cryptography and mechanism design can jointly overcome strategic manipulation in DeFi systems. Outside of research, I enjoy fantasy novels and anime, and am learning to play Indian flute.
PhD Computer Science
Duke University
Integrated B. Tech. and M. Tech. in Computer Science and Engineering
Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi
My research aims to understand and mitigate the security challenges introduced by strategic privileged players (e.g., block proposers) in decentralized systems. My projects explore both application-specific solutions for incentive manipulation and application-agnostic schemes for Minerβs Extractable Value (MEV) reduction. Overall, my goal is to develop principled methods to achieve accountable decentralized protocols, particularly in the presence of adversarial incentive manipulation attacks.
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Presented our work on Perils of Parallelism at the IC3 camp
Presented Perils of Parallelism at the Designing DeFi (DΒ²) workshop.
Talked about the security of blockchains, based on our papers, Data Independent OPE(CCS 24) and recent work on secure auction platforms.
How parallel and contingent execution breaks transaction fee mechanism incentives β rational padding attacks, an impossibility between protecting users vs. schedulers, and fee mechanisms that achieve the trade-off, with implications for chains like Sui and Monad.
Talked about Perils of creating a TFM aware of parallel execution
Talk about treating players as strategic in Blockchains, with results from Data Independent Ordering and an Inclusion List design for censorship resistance.
Talk about a new Inclusion List design - AUCIL
Limitations of and solutions for data-independent order policy enforcement.
Talk about our recent work on Data Independent Order Policy Enforecement, primarily focusing on our new solution-AnimaguSwap.
Talk about a new AMM design, AnimaguSwap β based on our paper Data Independent Order Policy Enforcement.
Presented a solution for data-independent order policy enforcement using game theory based on our paper- Data Independent Order Policy Enforcement.
Incentive attacks against HTLCs and a mitigation, He-HTLC.
Incentive attacks against HTLCs and a mitigation, He-HTLC.
Lightning talk on Incentive attacks against HTLCs and a mitigation, He-HTLC.